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SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS MODELS: 








Although social entrepreneurial organizations have begun to receive more scholarly 
attention, we still know relatively little about how they are able to create both social and 
economic value. This paper presents a comparative case analysis of three social 
entrepreneurial organizations, based in Bangladesh, Egypt and Spain, whose success has 
been widely recognized. Analysis of these organizations’ business models reveals common 
patterns: in their use of strategic resources, in their value networks, and in their customer 
interface. The findings suggest that successful social entrepreneurial organizations pro-
actively create their own value network of companies that share their social vision; develop 
resource strategies as an integral part of the business model; and integrate the target group 
into the social value network. Propositions are advanced regarding the business models of 










































“…A single ant is not God’s brightest creature. But as colonies, ants 
engage in food cultivation, temperature regulation, mass 
communication (using scent trails) and bloody, organized warfare. 
Ant colonies run themselves with an efficiency that outstrips human 
society. But no single über-ant manages the show.” 
 





In 2003 Dr. Ibrahim Abouleish was awarded the Right Livelihood Award, better 
known as the Alternative Nobel Prize. The jury saw in Sekem “a business model for the 21st 
century” (Right Livelihood Award 2003), one in which commercial success is integrated 
with and promotes social and cultural development.  
 
As societies search for more innovative, cost-effective, and sustainable ways to 
address social problems, “social ventures”, typically led by inspired individuals – so-called 
“social entrepreneurs” – have attracted increasing attention. Because they combine a social 
purpose with a for-profit mindset these initiatives are seen as an effective means to cater to 
largely unsatisfied social needs (Seelos and Mair 2005a,b), especially as traditional social 
sector activities often are considered inefficient, ineffective and unresponsive (Dees 2001).  
 
Research conducted in recent years has shed light on many interesting aspects of 
social entrepreneurs and their initiatives, e.g., the social entrepreneur as change agent (Dees 
2001); or the role of the founder, and his or her vision and individual traits (Drayton 2002; 
Bornstein, 2004). However, previous research has not examined how social entrepreneurs 
actually combine social and economic value creation by setting up self-sustained 
organizations. The structures they created, the co-operations and partnerships they struck, 
the way they not only positioned themselves in their industry’s value chain but also actively 
shaped it has rarely been taken into account. As a result, a number of questions remain 
unanswered. For example, we still have a limited understanding of how specific network 
building and resource procurement strategies facilitate the creation of social and economic 
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value. In addition, we know relatively little about how to ensure that the right target group 
captures the created value. 
 
The objective of this paper is to address these questions. In order to do this we have 
chosen to focus our analysis on three initiatives. All three – Grameen Bank (GB), 
Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa (MCC), and Sekem – started out as social ventures 
and were led by exceptional, visionary individuals; and all three developed into self-
sustained organizations. Moreover, they have been widely recognized as being both socially 
and economically successful (Wahid 1994, Right Livelihood Award 2003, Whyte and 
Whyte 1991). By examining these organizations, we aim to identify common patterns in 
their approaches and derive propositions on how a particular organizational set-up and 
business model can facilitate the creation and appropriation of social value. The chosen 
organizations reflect a wide spectrum of social ventures, as they address quite different 
social needs. Furthermore, they originated in different geographical regions, have different 
product and market scope, and also differ in size (see Table 1 for an overview of the 
selected organizations). This diversity allows us, despite the small sample, to advance 
preliminary propositions regarding the common features of successful social ventures that 
meet social needs and bring about social change. Importantly, the organizations studied here 




Table 1: The Organizations and their social and economic background 
 
  Grameen Bank  Sekem  MCC 
Country of Origin  Bangladesh Egypt  Spain 
Geographic Scope  Bangladesh Europe,  Middle-East, 
Africa 
Global 
Year of foundation  1983 1977  1955 




almost anything from 
kitchen appliances to 
parts for cars  
Number of 
Employees 
~12,000 ~2,000 ~70,000 
Target Group for 
social value creation 
Poor women living in 
rural areas of Bangladesh 
Egyptian society  Employees of co-
operatives and their 




The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly clarify terminology and 
introduce the research methodology. Second, we describe the three organizations, their 
historical development, and the social and economic context in which they operate. In the 
third part we closely examine their business models and distill the shared features that have 
enabled them to create social value in a sustainable way. To conclude we discuss the 










Social value means different things to different people. Initiatives as diverse as 
soup kitchens in major western cities, companies supplying drugs for neglected diseases in 
Africa, or educational programs to improve employment opportunities in Latin America 
may be seen as creating social value. We need a more precise definition of the term “social” 
in order to identify initiatives that create social value and therefore qualify as social 
ventures. For the purpose of this paper we define a social venture as an initiative that 
catalyzes social transformation and/or or addresses social needs. The creation of social value 
is the primary objective of the venture, while economic value creation is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition (Mair & Martí 2005).  
 
The term “business model” is another sometimes sketchy term. In general, a 
business model can be understood to be a simplification of a planned or existing business. 
Originally it was used in the context of data and process modeling for IT systems (Konczal 
1975, 12). Later, the term was defined and used differently, to encompass anything from 
structural elements (Selz 1999, 106) to agent interaction (Amit and Zott 2000) or knowledge 
leverage (Venkatraman and Henderson 1998). For this paper we use a conception based on 
Hamel’s definition of a business model (Hamel 2000, 65-112): a business concept that has 
been put into practice. 
 
More specifically, a business concept comprises four major components: Core 
Strategy, Strategic Resources, Customer Interface and Value Network (see Figure 1). As we 
will see later, this definition facilitates our understanding of how the specific business 

















This paper aims at identifying common features and patterns across the business 
models of successful social entrepreneurial organizations. Given the limited extent of 
knowledge on social entrepreneurship, we deliberately opted for an exploratory research 
approach. Our focus therefore lies on gathering propositions rather than testing hypotheses. 
Following Miles and Hubermann (1994) and Yin (1984), we apply a comparative case 
analysis design to capture the complexity and richness of the underlying phenomenon and 
detect patterns and regularities across cases.  
 
The selection of cases was based on the following criteria. First, the chosen 
organizations had to be widely recognized as successful and had to have successfully 
mastered the transition from the venture stage to that of the self-sustained organization. 
Second, they had to reflect diverse regional realities. Special attention was given to 




reveal patterns and features that hold across regional and national boundaries. Finally, 
priority was given to organizations which had already been described and documented and 
were open to additional data gathering via interviews.  
 
We gathered data from several sources: existing case studies, published and 
unpublished reports and articles, personal interviews with the founders (GB and Sekem) and 
organizational members (GB, Sekem, MCC), informed observation (Sekem), and Internet 
sources. These data helped us to identify patterns and compare patterns across cases.  
 
Although we are aware of the limitations of our sampling and data analysis 
approach, we consider this study as a first important step that provides tentative propositions 
for a more inclusive empirical research agenda in the future. In the next section we provide 









Grameen’s Mission  
 
The objective of the Grameen Bank is to bring financial services to the poor – 
women and the poorest in particular – in order to help them fight poverty by establishing 
profitable businesses (Yunus 2004). It is a composite objective, comprising social and 
economic elements. From the very beginning, the vision of Muhammad Yunus, founder of 
GB, was to help the poor to help themselves (Yunus and Jolis 1998), a vision that has kept 





The origin of Grameen Bank (gram means “village” in Bengali) dates back to 
1976, when the company was established by Muhammad Yunus, at that time a professor of 
Economics at Chittagong University in Bangladesh. According to Yunus, it all started with a 
field trip to a nearby village with his students (Yunus and Jolis 1998). During that trip, he 
became aware of the desperate situation of local women. Many of them supported their 
families by running little businesses: making chairs out of bamboo or selling home-grown 
vegetables, for example. However, many of them did not have the money to buy raw 
materials such as bamboo. And being denied access to regular loans, they had to resort to 
moneylenders and pay exorbitant interest rates. Moreover, as a condition of the loans, the 
chairs they produced had to be sold to the moneylenders at prearranged prices well below 
market value.  
 
After spending a day in the village of Jobra, Yunus got to know 42 women caught 
in this kind of poverty trap. When he asked them how much money they needed to buy their 
raw materials and become independent from the money lenders, he was surprised to learn 
that $27 would be sufficient for all of them (Mainsah et al. 2004, 2). To him this seemed a 
fairly small sum, and yet it could change the lives of these 42 women. It did not take him 
long to decide to extend loans himself, at reasonable rates. Since all of the women repaid the 
loans, he replicated this approach. Although he shared this success story with local banks, 
none of them was willing to lend to the poor. Therefore, Yunus decided to found his own 




cited as the birth of micro-finance (Mainsah et al. 2004, Schreiner 2001). By 1983, what had 
begun as a project with his students was a national bank, with 75 branches in five districts 
(Hassan et al. 1997, 1489).  
 
In the late 1980s, Yunus started to think of ways in which he could accelerate the 
progress towards a poverty-free world and, at the same time, improve Bangladesh’s overall 
economic performance (GB 2004). To extend the Grameen network he started off, again, 
with small local initiatives such as leasing unused fish ponds and irrigation pumps. Once 
successful, these initiatives were spun off and became independent of GB. Other initiatives, 
on the other hand, were originally created outside of GB but shared the same vision and 
joined the Grameen network later. Today this “Grameen Family of Organizations” 
comprises businesses ranging from telecom operations and energy to software development 
(Mainsah et al. 2004, 12).  
 
As of 2004, GB’s micro-credit operation has made a cumulative loan disbursement 
of $4.2 billion through 1,200 branches in Bangladesh. Today, GB has 3.5 million borrowers, 
95% of whom are women. The repayment rate is around a stunning 98% (Yunus 2004, 1). 
On top of this GB is now financially self-sustaining. Since 1995 GB has accepted no 
funding or donations from overseas sources, and operations have been run with members’ 
deposits. In 2004 GB started an interest-free loan program for beggars, or so-called 
“struggling members”, which soon reached 7,000 beggars (Kamaluddin, 2004). The bank 
itself has created employment for over 12,000 staff. In 1994, according to GB, the bank 
contributed 1.5% to the GDP of Bangladesh, a figure comparable with that of Wal-Mart in 





Bangladesh came into existence in 1971 when Bengali East Pakistan seceded from 
its union with West Pakistan. It is one of the world’s Least Developed Countries, as 
recognized by the UN, and has a Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of 138 out of 
175 listed countries. By 2004 the population had almost doubled from 75 million in the mid-
seventies and is expected to rise to 190 million by 2015 (United Nations Development 
Program 2004).  
 
At the time GB was established, per capita income was about $300 per year, the 
economy was based on farming and agriculture, and around 90% of the population lived in 
rural areas (US Federal Research Division 1988). Today the service sector contributes 
roughly two thirds of GDP, yet it fails to provide jobs in sufficient numbers and farming 
remains the most important form of employment.  
 
Major impediments to growth include: frequent cyclones and floods, inefficient 
state-owned enterprises, a rapidly growing labor force that cannot be absorbed by the 
farming sector, delays in exploiting energy resources (natural gas), insufficient energy 
supplies, and slow implementation of economic reforms. Living conditions in Bangladesh 
are extremely harsh. In 2002, life expectancy at birth was 61 years, the adult literacy rate 
was only 41.1%, and almost 50% of the population was living below the national poverty 
line (United Nations Development Program, 2004).  Gender inequality is also a problem: 
Bangladesh has a higher rate of female economic activity than Norway, but its women work 
mostly in rural agriculture and industry, earning around half the income of men and with 








Sekem’s declared mission is to “meet the challenges of the time by contributing 
towards the all-encompassing development of man, community and the earth” (Merckens 
2000). This is an aspiration that its founder, Dr. Abouleish, has not stopped working on for 





Sekem – the transliteration of a hieroglyph meaning “vitality from the sun” – is the 
name of an initiative that goes back as far as Grameen Bank. In 1977, Dr. Ibrahim 
Abouleish, after living in Austria for more than 20 years, brought his family to his native 
Egypt to show them the beauty of his home country. What he found was a country in 
miserable economic condition and with increasing social problems.  Inspired by the 
anthroposophic and holistic approach of Rudolf Steiner, he developed a plan to “heal the 
land and the people” (Abouleish 2004). He envisioned an organization that would comprise 
not only an economic sphere but also a social and cultural one. This was the beginning of an 
initiative that earned Dr. Ibrahim Abouleish the Right Livelihood Award (better know as the 
“Alternative Nobel Prize”) in 2003.  
 
Having started out with biodynamic cultivation of herbs and spices, as well as 
medicinal and aromatic plants, Sekem has become a renowned enterprise and market leader 
in organic food and phytopharmaceuticals in Egypt. Furthermore, it is responsible for the 
nation-wide application of biodynamic methods to control pests and improve crop yields in 
the production of cotton (Merckens 2000). 
 
Today, some 2,000 people work for Sekem. In 2003 the Sekem group reported 
revenues of 73 million Egyptian pounds (1€~7EP) (The Schwab Foundation, 2003). Under 
the umbrella of a holding organization, the group comprises six companies. Their activities 
span from packing and distributing herbs and fresh fruit to the manufacture of 
phytopharmaceuticals and organic textiles. Besides the companies, Sekem has also 
established and now promotes the Egyptian Society for Cultural Development (SCD). 
Through this non-profit organization Sekem supports a kindergarten, the Institute for Adult 
Training, a Medical Center, various other social and cultural activities, and is in the process 





When Dr. Abouleish returned to Egypt in the mid-seventies, he found a devastated 
country. Suffering from a socialist economic system put in place by former president Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war against Israel in 1973, Egypt was 
struggling to improve living conditions for its population. Reforms to liberalize markets by 
president Anwar Sadat put additional stress on living conditions and increased income 
inequality, leading to violent demonstrations and riots in 1977 (US Federal Research 
Division, 1988).  
 
Although economic conditions have improved, Egypt still has poor health care and 
inadequate education systems. In 2002, 16% of the population was living under the national 




males and 43% for females (United Nations Development Program, 2004). As in 
Bangladesh, gender inequality is also high. 
 
The agricultural sector is Egypt’s major employer, accounting for 40% of the 
workforce. However, periodic droughts and unpredictable, hot, driving windstorms can have 
a devastating effect on its output. Today, only 3.5% of the land is actually arable, having 
been dramatically reduced by the completion of the Aswan High Dam, which altered the 
time-honored place of the Nile River in the agriculture and ecology of Egypt. Increasing soil 
salination, the growing popularity of monocultures and the lack of the flooding which 
previously redistributed fertile Nile soils have led to ever increasing use of pesticides and 
the pollution of limited natural fresh water resources.  
 
 




MCC’s mission can best be described as combining basic business objectives with 
the use of democratic organizational methods, job creation, personal and professional 






On February 5, 1941 José María Arizmendiarrieta, a young priest, arrived in 
Mondragón, a little town in the Basque country. Although he wanted to study sociology, his 
monsignor had sent him to this small deprived town (Whyte and Whyte 1991). At the time 
of Arizmendiarrieta’s arrival, Mondragón’s economic life revolved around Unión Cerrajera, 
a large foundry and metalworking company. Ownership and management positions in this 
firm were closely restricted to family and friends; career development for local workers was 
almost non-existent. The young priest’s first activities were focused on creating 
opportunities for the local youth. He founded the “Escuela Politécnica Profesional”, a 
school aimed at providing technical education. The school was organized as a cooperative, 
i.e., it was owned by members of the local community rather than by the government or the 
Church. This marked the beginning of a movement that led to the founding of numerous 
cooperatives in subsequent years.  
 
In the early 1950s, empowered by these educational initiatives but still facing 
limited opportunities for economic development, five graduates of Arizmendiarrieta’s 
school decided to set up their own business. Inspired by Arizmendiarrieta’s vision and 
values, they organized their business as a cooperative. After some struggles with state 
authorities, ULGOR (the name is a combination of the founders’ initials), the first industrial 
cooperative of what has become Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa (MCC), was born. It 
produced electrical and mechanical products for home use and was an instant success. By 
the early 1960s ULGOR was on the way to becoming one of the hundred largest industrial 
companies in Spain (Whyte and Whyte 1991). 
 
Encouraged by the success of ULGOR, others set up similar enterprises, most of 
them also arising out of the social and educational mobilization guided by Arizmendiarrieta. 
The first of these enterprises produced components for ULGOR products and hence 
benefited from ULGOR’s success. In 1959 Caja Laboral, a cooperative bank, was 
established to help the organizations in this emerging network overcome their financing 




this stage they were independent of each other and Arizmendiarrieta usually only provided 
advisory services. 
 
By the end of the 1960s the total number of cooperatives had risen to 41, and the 
boom lasted until the end of the 1970s. Like most companies, however, they could not 
escape economic recession and some were forced to close. Subsequently, the whole group 
of cooperatives underwent a significant reorganization, with the creation of common bodies 
for co-ordination and decision taking.  
 
Today, MCC is the seventh largest business group in Spain by revenues. The 
product and service portfolio ranges from household goods to components to machine tools 
to supermarkets. Business operations are organized into three groups: financial, industrial 
and distribution. In 2003, the industrial group had total sales of €4,379 million and the 
distribution group, €5,276 million. MCC has a global presence, with 38 production plants 
worldwide. With a total of 68,260 jobs, the group ranked third among employers in Spain in 





Mondragón came into being during the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. 
From the end of the Spanish civil war in 1939 to his death in 1975, Franco imposed tight 
controls on political, social and economic life and installed an autarkic economic regime 
which lasted until the early 1950s. By this time, per capita gross domestic product was 
barely 40% of the average for Western European countries.  
 
After Franco’s death, Spain experienced a complete turnaround: democracy was 
implemented, inflation and unemployment fell steadily and a remarkable economic boom 
beginning in the mid 80s has created an economy which, today, supports a GDP per capita 
that is 80% that of the four leading Western European countries. Efforts to modernize and 
expand the economy were greatly aided by a number of factors, including EC membership, 
the continuing fall in oil prices, increased tourism, a sharp reduction in the exchange value 
of the US dollar, and a massive upsurge in the inflow of foreign investment (CIA, 2004).  
 
 
The Basque Country 
 
The Basque Country comprises three provinces at the north western border with 
France. Though part of Spain, the Basques are culturally different from the Spaniards, with 
a strong sense of identity which is tied to Euskera, the Basque language. Historically an 
important economic area, the Basque provinces have been at the center of the Spanish 
shipbuilding, steel and iron industries. The guilds of craftsmen that formed in these 
industries provided the cultural basis of what was to become the cooperative movement in 
the Basque country (Turnbull 1995, Whyte and Whyte 1991).  
 
During the civil war, the Basque Country was especially ravaged. Unemployment 
was very high and the area around Mondragón had a bleak economic outlook. Today, 
however, the region of Mondragón is at the top of the Spanish per capita income scale and 
has the most equal distribution of wealth in Spain. As of 2001 MCC contributed 3.7% to the 







Identifying common features of success  
 
All these organizations have created social value: Grameen Bank by alleviating 
poverty for women in Bangladesh, Sekem by introducing organic farming as well as by 
fostering cultural and social life in Egypt, and Mondragón by creating jobs and 
opportunities for people who did not have them before. These three organizations not only 
vary substantially in their “social” mission, they also build on different organizational set-
ups and act in very different environments. Yet, we can identify common features which, we 
believe, account for their success in combining social and economic value creation in a 
sustainable manner.  
 
Previous studies on social entrepreneurs and their ventures have emphasized the 
important role of the founder, the founder’s vision, and the founder’s individual traits 
(Drayton 2002, Bornstein 2004).  As our descriptions of the three initiatives have illustrated, 
the individual visions of the founders of GB, Sekem, and MCC are idiosyncratically linked 
to the fundamental social problem they aim to address.  
 
In this paper, we deliberately focus on common features of the particular business 
models which have allowed the three initiatives to develop into self-sustained and 
successful social entrepreneurial organizations. Our analysis reveals that the organizations 
share commonalities in their approach to: (1) the creation of value networks, (2) the 
procurement of strategic resources, and (3) the management of the customer interface. All 
three are important pillars of any business model, as defined by Hamel (Hamel 2000).  
 
In more detail, the first pattern we observed is the way the founders (social 
entrepreneurs) pro-actively created specific value networks to facilitate social value creation 
and appropriation by the target group. The second pattern is the way these organizations 
crafted innovative resource strategies to secure critical and scarce resources, and how they 
incorporated these strategies into their business models. The third pattern is the novel way in 
which they define and set up the customer interface. All three organizations interact in a 
special way with their target groups, i.e. the groups for which they primarily want to create 
social value. We believe that these common patterns played an important role in how GB, 
Sekem and MCC succeeded in their social endeavors and became self-sustained 
organizations.  
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the common patterns along the three business 
model components. In the following section we elaborate in more detail on how these 





Table 2: Overview of Patterns along Business Model Components 
 
 
  Grameen Bank  SEKEM  MCC 
VALUE NETWORK 
Positions controlled or 
significantly influenced 
in the value network 
  Provision of 
complementary 
goods through the 
“Grameen Family”. 
This family includes 
businesses ranging 
from telecoms to 
electricity to 
knitwear. 
  Influence on sourcing 
through control of 
supervisory authority 
(EBDA)  
  Production 
  Distribution 
  R&D 
  Finance 
  Social Security 
  Sourcing 
  Research & 
Development 
  HR Training & 
Development 
  Depending on the 
product, several steps 





into business model 
  Funding 
  Human Resources 
  Risk Management  
  Raw Materials, i.e. 
organically grown 
crops and herbs 
  
  Funding 
  Highly skilled 
employees 




Integration of target 
group 
  Borrowers are also 
owners of GB 
  Borrowers are turned 
into entrepreneurs, 
with support and 
within the value 
network 
 
  Farmers network 




called “mother farm”  
 
  Employees are to a 
large extent also 
owners 
  Reallocation of 
employees 







Composition and Structure of Value Networks 
 
In recent years, the notion of value networks has come to the fore in academic 
research (Borgatti and Foster 2003). Value networks have been analyzed in various ways: 
with respect to their potential to create competitive advantage (Stabell and Fjeldstadt 1998, 
413), added value and distributive power (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996), and as a 
means to achieve collective objectives (Todeva and Knoke 2002). Research has also focused 
on consumption and production externalities (Economides 1996), and value creation and 
appropriation in general (Winther 2001, Zott and Amit 2002). Although these authors view 
value networks differently, they agree on their importance for the creation and distribution 
of value. As a result, value networks have been repeatedly viewed as fundamental elements 
of business models (Hamel 2000, Chesbrough and Rosenbloom 2002). 
 
GB, Sekem and MCC all proactively created social value networks from the very 
beginning. These value networks allowed them to offer complementary goods on the supply 
side, and establish positive network effects among consumers on the demand side, with the 
final objective of increasing the creation and appropriation of value for their target group. 
Thus, whenever a critical activity or link was missing in the network (which may have 
hindered the appropriation of value by their target group), the three organizations either 
filled this gap themselves or facilitated the creation of a new company to provide the 
missing link. In sum, within their respective social value networks, GB, Sekem and MCC 
either perform critical activities themselves or partner with companies that share their social 
vision. Every single part of the social value network thus created plays a specific role in the 






Sekem, for example, partnered at a very early stage with distributors (Lebensbaum 
and Piramide) in Germany. These two companies shared Sekem’s vision and had their own 
missions of social responsibility. While these efforts focused on distribution, Sekem was 
also active on the sourcing side. In 1986 it partnered with a German pharmaceutical 
company, Dr. Schaette, in order to develop and conduct research on the 
phytopharmaceutical market. This was followed, in 1990, by the establishment of The 
Centre of Organic Agriculture in Egypt (COAE), a non-profit organization whose purpose 
was to establish biodynamic standards for Egyptian growers, as well as to offer training and 
consultancy services to those applying such standards (Merckens 2000). Later, the 
foundation of the Egyptian Biodynamic Association (EBDA) complemented COAE’s 
efforts by providing consultancy services to farmers during their transition to biodynamic 
agriculture. With this combination, Sekem was able to set a number of standards for 
biodynamic agriculture in Egypt. Furthermore, these initiatives allowed Sekem to expand its 
impact by realizing its mission beyond the direct reach of the business group. 
 
Sekem also realizes its mission through the Egyptian Society of Cultural 
Development (SCD), an organization it founded as an umbrella for all the group’s 
predominantly social activities. Among other things, SCD runs a school, a medical center, 
and several education & training centers.  Social value, in Sekem’s sense, is not only created 





GB created a slightly different value network. As mentioned, Yunus’s vision was 
to alleviate poverty for women in Bangladesh. Based on the belief that every human being is 
able to help him or herself, he started with a bank providing micro-finance, convinced that 
giving small loans would enable borrowers to either establish a business or to grow and 
expand an existing business.  
 
With the arrival of the Internet, however, he realized that providing loans might not 
be enough to overcome the digital divide. Yunus addressed this concern by founding 
Grameen Telecom and Grameen Phone (Lawsonn and Meyenn 2000). In co-operation with 
GB, these two companies created the “Village Phone” plan, whereby women are able to buy 
a mobile phone, financed through a loan from GB, and offer telephone services in villages 
that are not yet connected to the national telecom system.  
 
Like Sekem, Grameen created a dedicated organization, Grameen Trust, to promote 
its activities and lobby for the necessary regulatory and legal reform. One of Grameen 
Trust’s explicit aims is to build an international network of concerned people and 
institutions working in the field of poverty alleviation. It also aims to organize and conduct 
any project or enterprise that will help increase employment, income and management skills 
among the poor.  
 
Another extension of GB’s social value network was the Grameen Fund. After 
operating GB for some time, Yunus realized that many of the business ideas that people 
presented to him could help realize his vision but did not fit into the GB loan policy. They 
were economically compelling and socially progressive but did not fall within the scope of 
GB’s initial objective of providing micro-credit to the very poor. Hence, the Grameen Fund 





Besides the companies already mentioned, another 14 companies make up the 
social value network, the so-called “Grameen Family”, created by GB. Through this 
network GB not only lends money to the very poor; it also offers specific business models 
that enable borrowers to set up a business; it educates them to advance economically and 
socially; it creates and offers jobs, promotes the use of high technology, and facilitates 
replication efforts in other countries. The Grameen Family is a powerful network that 





MCC is probably the best example of the creation of a social value network. Based 
on the ideas of Arizmendiarrieta, MCC cooperatives focused from the very beginning on the 
education, rights and development of their workers. The social value network has therefore 
evolved around these objectives. The “Escuela Politécnica Profesional”, as the starting point 
of the cooperative movement, was just the first node in this network. The first industrial 
cooperative proved to be another central part of the value network, in that it became a major 
customer for subsequent cooperatives that were established in Mondragón.  
 
However, having been set up as cooperatives and lacking significant collateral, 
most of the organizations in the network lacked financial robustness and therefore faced 
severe growth constraints. Arizmendiarrieta, realizing this problem, soon started to work on 
a plan for a cooperative bank. Although the idea was at first dismissed by the founders of 
the first cooperative, he continued to work on his plan. Convinced that a bank would be 
crucial for the future success of his “social experiment”, he even forged two signatures he 
needed for the banking license (Whyte and Whyte 1991). Caja Laboral Popular was thus 
brought into existence and subsequently became the backbone of Mondragón’s 
development.  
 
Further elements of the value network were added based on necessities and 
opportunities. The cooperative organizational set-up had a significant disadvantage, namely 
the denial of state social benefits for members. As owners of the cooperatives, workers and 
employees were denied access to the national social benefit plans available at that time. To 
meet this social need MCC created an insurance company, Lagun-Aro. In order to foster 
competitiveness some of the cooperatives created the Ikerlan Research Center in 1974, 
which has not only provided applied technological research for the founding members but 
for the whole cooperative group and the Basque government.  
 
In contrast to SEKEM and GB, the Mondragón group cooperatives not only 
support each other by providing products or solutions that complement the offerings of other 
companies within the network, but also support each other financially in times of need. 
During the 1980s, in particular, many cooperatives were only able to survive thanks to 
financial transfers within the Mondragón Group.  
 
To reiterate, by establishing education centers, financial institutions and strong 
supplier/customer relationships within the Mondragón Group, a social value network was 
created spanning from sourcing to production and distribution – from education to research 
and technical assistance. This allows MCC to combine economic viability and social value 
creation in a sustainable way. 
 
From the observations described above we propose: 
 
Proposition 1: Successful social entrepreneurial organizations pro-actively create 






Another area in which the three organizations show similarities is in how they 
incorporated resource strategies into their business models. Each organization innovatively 
built a business model which made sure that critical resources would be provided in a 
sustainable manner. Foreseeable resource needs were not simply seen as a sourcing problem 
but as an opportunity to expand the value network even further. By using this approach GB, 
Sekem and MCC were able to expand the reach of their social value creation and solve their 





The first resource problem Abouleish faced when he started Sekem was the 
availability of organically grown crops, which were essential for the first organic medicinal 
products he planned to produce. Biodynamic or organic farming was not popular among 
farmers at that time. One of the reasons was the prevailing belief that organic farming was a 
risky venture with low yields and limited returns. The quick solution Abouleish found was 
to acquire additional farmland, so that he could grow whatever he needed himself. However, 
he also knew that this approach would not carry far and could limit the scalability of his 
business. He therefore needed to foster organic farming in Egypt on a large scale. He 
achieved this by establishing COAE and, a few years later, EBDA. Both institutions 
provided training and consultancy services, and defined standards for farmers and 
processing firms interested in organic farming in Egypt. 
 
Abouleish went one step further and found a way to exert influence over the whole 
sector. Through COAE, which in 1992 was appointed as the private body responsible for the 
inspection and approval of organic products for export to the EU, Sekem today controls 
organic farming standards in Egypt. Through EBDA, it controls the use of the DEMETER 
trademark, belonging to an international ecological association that represents about 3000 
producers in 40 countries. 
 
Overall, Abouleish’s approach ensured that the number of farmers converting to 
organic methods grew continuously, thereby improving the supply of raw materials for 
Sekem. By the end of 2003, some 800 farmers from Aswan to Alexandria were using 





What are vital resources for a bank? Obviously cash, but what else? If we were 
talking about banks in developed countries, we would probably add personnel to analyze 
customers and their creditworthiness. Other elements might include branches in major cities, 
a computer-system for surveillance and control, and so on. Yunus had none of these things 
when he founded GB. All he had was his knowledge of economics and his personal funds. 
Yet he still managed to establish a successful, if not the most successful, micro-finance 
institution worldwide. 
 
One important part of GB’s business model is the “group lending” method (Letelier 
et al. 2003). Through this method, GB was able to solve several resource problems. Firstly, 
it saved on personnel, because the groups of borrowers selected and monitored themselves, 
obviating the need for labor-intensive monitoring and verification by the bank. Secondly, it 
was able to reach many potential borrowers very quickly, without significant personnel 




requirements. To qualify for a loan from GB, individuals must form a group of five 
borrowers. This group defines several steps in the loan process, e.g., the amount needed and 
when each member of the group will receive the loan. It also provides “social collateral”, as 
the group is responsible for making sure that each member pays back his or her loan. The 
members of each group exercise enormous peer pressure on each other, as they know 
everyone in the group well enough to understand how important the money is to them. If 
one member defaults, other members of the group will be deprived of much needed funds. 
The defaulting member’s reputation in the village will suffer. Determining a borrower’s 
individual default risk is very costly; it is also costly to ensure that borrowers take actions 
that facilitate repayment. Members of a credit group, however, are self-selected, and 
potential defaulters are weeded out at the very start. Thus, GB effectively exploits the 
villagers’ local knowledge to select its customers. Moreover, the resulting peer pressure 
ensures that borrowers pay back the loans.  
 
Like any other bank, GB required deposits to transfer into loans. While, initially, 
GB depended on donations to make loans, its goal from the very beginning was to become 
financially self-sustained, a goal that was achieved in 1995. This financial self-sustainability 
was achieved through several measures. Firstly, borrowers are required to pay into different 
kinds of deposits (Schreiner 2001, 8). From the very first day of their loan, group members 
are required to contribute to a private savings plan. The conditions on these savings plans 
are very attractive and many people who do not actually borrow money from GB may have 
one. For GB this has become a major source of refinancing at low rates. Each month such 
savings plans bring in over Tk 100 million (US $ 1.75 million) as deposits towards pension 
savings. GB can now rest assured that it will have enough of its own money to expand its 
lending operation in the future (Yunus 2002). Secondly, it also sells GB stocks to borrowers. 
By so doing, GB not only improves its funding basis but also strengthens the sense of 





Mondragón’s resource strategy is slightly more complex. As MCC is a group of 
more than 160 cooperatives, it is difficult to talk about one single business model. However, 
the cooperatives have developed extremely close ties and, in fact, share the services of many 
organizations within the network. In this sense the structure resembles the value chain of a 
business organization in which support functions are provided by individual organizations. 
Such functions include financing, research, and training and development. 
Arrizmendiarrieta directly initiated almost all of these support organizations, a fact that 
illustrates his foresight and skills in developing a business model that took account of 
resource needs at a nearly stage.  
 
One of the resources which became essential early on was, again, funding. As 
organizations owned by their employees, the cooperatives could only tap into the financial 
resources of their owners, which usually were very limited. Furthermore, the fact that the 
cooperative concept was new to banks, combined with the lack of collateral, made corporate 
loans nearly inaccessible. Obtaining funds for running the business was therefore a major 
concern and was one of the main reasons why Arizmendiarrieta pushed so hard for the 
creation of a cooperative bank. Through Caja Laboral Popular the Mondragón Group was 
able to increase the savings rate and channel these savings to productive investments within 
the cooperative. In the first years the cooperatives severed their ties to other financial 
institutions and started to work exclusively with Caja Laboral Popular. Through this bank 
and its policy, funding could be provided to newly established and troubled cooperatives 





Another resource issue that could potentially limit the growth opportunities of 
newly established cooperatives was the lack of a highly educated and specialized workforce. 
Many companies, at the time MCC was established, left this problem to the government. 
MCC, however, not only maintained but also supported and expanded the teaching 
institutions it had created. Supervised through the “League for Education and Culture”, 
MCC oversees the education system within the organization. This system includes a 
polytechnic school, a business school and a professional college. MCC also has strong ties 
with Mondragón University, which was promoted and is supported by educational 
organizations within MCC (Errasti et al. 2004). Graduates of these organizations also 
provide a constant stream of talent for MCC. 
 
From the above discussion we suggest: 
 
Proposition 2: Successful social entrepreneurial organizations carefully assess 
their resource needs and accordingly design a resource strategy that is integrated into the 
business model at an early stage 
 
 
Interface with the Target Group 
 
The third area in which we observed similarities between Sekem, MCC and GB 
was the way value was transferred to the target group. This common pattern reflects the 
customer interface part of the business model. For the purpose of this study, the “customers” 
are the beneficiaries of the social value created by the organizations we are considering. In 
other words, we use the terms customers and target group interchangeably. The social value 
created by our three organizations takes various forms; in all cases, however, it was created 
by delivering a product or service to the target group. In this sense, members of the target 
group are customers. Knowledge about, interaction with, and relationships with this group 
are as crucial for successful social ventures as are relationships with regular customers for 
traditional business ventures.   
 
We found that each of our three sample organizations created a special interface 
with its target group, integrating customers into its social value network or even, whenever 
possible, into its organization. Targeted individuals are thereby involved in the value 
creation process and enabled to capture value. This approach sets these organizations apart 
from the usual development organizations, which very often view their target groups, at the 
end of the value chain, as mere recipients of donations or services at highly subsidized 
prices.  
 
The logic that led to the integration of target groups into the social value network is 
straightforward. The founders of Sekem, MCC and GB believed that every individual is 
capable of, and responsible for, helping him or herself once the right conditions are created 
(Letelier 2003, Auwal 1996, Whyte and Whyte 1991). This capability, however, is only 
effective if enacted with a sense of responsibility.  Hence, they created networks in which 
their target groups could take responsibility for their own fate, and that facilitated the 
development of individuals and the community. By integrating the target group into their 
social value networks, the organizations were able to create employment, gain market 
knowledge, and interact directly with their customers. In sum, Sekem, GB and MCC helped 






Building on Dr Abouleish’s vision to “heal the country” by integrating “social, 
cultural and economic life”, Sekem’s target group could be defined as Egyptian society in 
general.  Although it is almost impossible to integrate the whole of society into a social 
value network, Sekem is trying to achieve this in as much as its size permits.   
 
Central to this effort is the concept of the “mother farm”, which is where Sekem 
employees live and work, benefitting from the environment created by the organization. 
Based on a 2000 hectare plot, the mother farm includes the farming and processing 
facilities, but also housing, a kindergarten, a school, and a hospital. Basically, it is a little 
village in which almost all Abouleish’s visions are realized. It is a healthier environment 
than probably anywhere else in Egypt. The same is true of the workplaces. Besides creating 
safe and attractive workplaces, Sekem also provides training and education. Moreover, it 
encourages all employees to devote 10% of their time to cultural or social activities such as 
painting, singing and the like. On the sourcing side of its social value network, Sekem 
formed a network of farmers who share their experiences in organic farming and help one 
another.  
 
Sekem integrated its target group – Egyptians – into its value chain. Firstly, it 
created jobs, which were desperately needed in a country with an unofficial unemployment 
rate of nearly 20%. Secondly, in line with the customer interface approach discussed above, 
it created a healthy environment, offering cultural, social and professional services that 





The group which Muhammed Yunus targeted right from the beginning was the 
poorest of the poor in rural Bangladesh, predominantly women. GB integrated these women 
into the social value network in two ways. First, it made them member-owners, i.e., the vast 
majority of the shares of GB are owned by former or current borrowers. This system 
ensured that the poor would also be able to capture the value created through GB, either 
through profits, which would flow back to the borrowers as owners, or through favorable 
credit terms, which a profit-maximizing bank would not offer. Based on the principle of 
establishing capability and responsibility in parallel, as discussed above, this structure 
included the responsibility of owning and partly running a bank. 
 
Second, and more interestingly, GB tried to turn its borrowers into entrepreneurs. 
Many other activities undertaken by GB and organizations set up or supported by it 
facilitated this process. Again, by this means GB ensured that the value created through the 





At MCC we can observe a similar pattern. As members of cooperatives, the 
workers were at the same time owners. All the MCC organizations that emerged around the 
industrial and distribution cooperatives, such as Caja Laboral Popular or Lagun-Aro, are 
owned partly by workers of the related cooperatives.  
 
Moreover, strong supplier/customer relationships exist within the MCC network, 
which has ensured that any value created is captured within the network and by the target 




of the way MCC evolved – as a web of interrelated and dependent organizations (Malo and 
Vézina 2004). The growth of this network of organizations was assisted by a special 
division of Caja Laboral which evaluated new business opportunities and facilitated the 
establishment of new organizations (Turnbull 1995). 
 
Based on these observation we state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Successful social entrepreneurial organizations integrate their 




Learning points and conclusion 
 
Our aim in this paper has been to identify common features of organizations that 
have succeeded in developing from social ventures into self-sustained organizations creating 
social and economic value. We have examined the business models of three very different 
organizations – Sekem, GB, and MCC – which are widely recognized as successful 
examples of social entrepreneurial organizations. Our analysis has revealed that these 
organizations share similar approaches with respect to three elements of any business 
model, namely the value network, the resource strategy, and the customer interface. In 
particular, our findings suggest three conclusions. First, successful social entrepreneurial 
organizations do not just position themselves at a specific point in an industry value chain 
but pro-actively create their own value network of companies that share their social vision. 
Second, the three organizations ensured that the resource strategy was an integral part of 
their business model. And third, all three companies employed a special approach to transfer 
value to the groups they targeted: they integrated the target group into the social value 
network at a very early stage, so that the target group played a vital role in creating value 
and at the same time was able to capture a significant portion of that value.  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on social entrepreneurship. While 
previous studies focused on the who (the social entrepreneur and his special characteristics) 
or the what (the outcome of social entrepreneurial activity), this study addresses the how: 
how social entrepreneurs successfully combine social and economic value creation, and how 
they transform social ventures into self-sustained organizations. Our hope is to stimulate 
future empirical research that builds on these qualitative findings. The paper also offers 
interesting insights to prompt existing for-profit multibusiness companies to rethink their 
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